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Abstract
This work fits in the context of community microgrids, where members of a community can exchange energy and services
among themselves, without going through the usual channels of the public electricity grid. We introduce and analyze a
framework to operate a community microgrid, and to share the resulting revenues and costs among its members. A market-
oriented pricing of energy exchanges within the community is obtained by implementing an internal local market based
on the marginal pricing scheme. The market aims at maximizing the social welfare of the community, thanks to the more
efficient allocation of resources, the reduction of the peak power to be paid, and the increased amount of reserve, achieved
at an aggregate level. A community microgrid operator, acting as a benevolent planner, redistributes revenues and costs
among the members, in such a way that the solution achieved by each member within the community is not worse than the
solution it would achieve by acting individually. In this way, each member is incentivized to participate in the community
on a voluntary basis. The overall framework is formulated in the form of a bilevel model, where the lower level problem
clears the market, while the upper level problem plays the role of the community microgrid operator. Numerical results
obtained on a real test case implemented in Belgium show around 54% cost savings on a yearly scale for the community, as
compared to the case when its members act individually.
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Nomenclature
Acronyms
DG Distributed generation.
DSO Distribution system operator.
Sets and indices
Name Description
d Index of a device.
Dnflu Set of non-flexible loads belonging to entity u ∈
U .
Dnfl Set of all non-flexible loads, where Dnfl = ∪uDnflu .
Dnstu Set of non-steerable generators belonging to en-
tity u ∈ U .
Dnst Set of all non-steerable generators, where Dnst =
∪uDnstu .
Dsheu Set of sheddable loads belonging to entity u ∈ U .
Dshe Set of all sheddable loads, where Dshe = ∪uDsheu .
Dsteu Set of steerable generators belonging to entity
u ∈ U .
Dste Set of all steerable generators, where Dste =
∪uDsteu .
Dstou Set of storage devices belonging to entity u ∈ U .
Dsto Set of all storage devices, where Dsto = ∪uDstou .
t Index of a time period.
T Number of time periods.
T Set of time periods, with T = {1, 2, ..., T}.
u Index of an entity of the community microgrid.
U Set of all entities of the community.
Parameters
Name Description Unit
Cnfld,t Non-flexible power consumption at time
period t, with d ∈ Dnfl.
kW
Cshed,t Flexible power consumption at time pe-
riod t, with d ∈ Dshe.
kW
Ecapu,t Maximum power export to the grid at
time period t, with u ∈ U .
kW
Icapu,t Maximum power import from the grid
at time period t, with u ∈ U .
kW
P nstd,t Non-steerable power generation at time
period t, with d ∈ Dnst.
kW
P sted,t Steerable power generation at time pe-
riod t, with d ∈ Dste.
kW
P d Maximum charging power of battery d,
with d ∈ Dsto.
kW
P d Maximum discharging power of bat-
tery d, with d ∈ Dsto.
kW
Sd Maximum capacity of battery d, with
d ∈ Dsto.
kWh
Sd Minimum capacity of battery d, with
d ∈ Dsto.
kWh
Sinitd Initial state of charge of battery d, with
d ∈ Dsto.
kWh
Sendd Final state of charge of battery d, with
d ∈ Dsto.
kWh
JSUu Optimal profit of entity u ∈ U acting
individually.
e
γstod Unitary cost for usage of battery d, with
d ∈ Dsto.
e/kWh
γcom Unitary fee of the community microgrid
operator.
e/kWh
ηchad Charging efficiency of battery d, with
d ∈ Dsto.
/
ηdisd Discharging efficiency of battery d, with
d ∈ Dsto.
/
pipeak Unitary cost (penalty) for peak power. e/kW
pires Unitary revenue for providing reserve
capacity.
e/kW
pished,t Unitary cost of load shedding at time
period t, with d ∈ Dshe.
e/kWh
pisted,t Unitary cost of generating energy at
time period t, with d ∈ Dste.
e/kWh
piegrt Unit price of energy exported to the
grid at time period t.
e/kWh
piigrt Unit price of energy imported from the
grid at time period t.
e/kWh
∆T Duration of a time period. hrs
Variables
Name Range Description Unit
α R+ Slack variable to be maximized. e
ashed,t [0, 1] Fraction of flexible power con-
sumption that is shed at time pe-
riod t, with d ∈ Dshe.
/
asted,t [0, 1] Fraction of steerable power gen-
eration that is activated at time
period t, with d ∈ Dste.
/
achad,t [0, 1] Fraction of the maximum charg-
ing power used for battery d at
time period t, with d ∈ Dsto.
/
adisd,t [0, 1] Fraction of the maximum dis-
charging power used for battery d
at time period t, with d ∈ Dsto.
/
ecomu,t R+ Energy exported to the commu-
nity at time period t by entity
u ∈ U .
kWh
egriu,t R+ Energy exported to the grid at
time period t by entity u ∈ U .
kWh
icomu,t R+ Energy imported from the com-
munity at time period t by entity
u ∈ U .
kWh
igriu,t R+ Energy imported from the grid at
time period t by entity u ∈ U .
kWh
p R+ Peak power of the microgrid over
the planning horizon T .
kW
pu R+ Contribution to the peak power of
the microgrid assigned to entity
u ∈ U .
kW
rsym R+ Symmetric power reserve pro-
vided by the microgrid through
all periods of the planning hori-
zon T .
kW
rsymu R+ Contribution to the symmetric
power reserve of the microgrid as-
signed to entity u ∈ U .
kW
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rincu,t R+ Upward reserve of power available
at time period t and provided by
entity u ∈ U .
kW
rdecu,t R+ Downward reserve of power avail-
able at time period t and provided
by entity u ∈ U .
kW
rs+d,t R+ Upward reserve of power available
at time period t and provided by
storage device d ∈ Dsto.
kW
rs−d,t R+ Downward reserve of power avail-
able at time period t and provided
by storage device d ∈ Dsto.
kW
sd,t [Sd, Sd] State of charge of battery d at
time period t, with d ∈ Dsto.
kWh
Ju R Total profit of entity u ∈ U acting
in the community.
e
Jenergyu R Energy component of the profit of
entity u ∈ U .
e
Jpeaku R− Peak power component of the
profit of entity u ∈ U .
e
J reserveu R+ Reserve component of the profit
of entity u ∈ U .
e
J* R Optimal profit of the community
microgrid.
e
Dual Variables
Name Range Corresponding constraint
κs+d,t R+ Storage upward reserve, state of
charge.
κs−d,t R+ Storage downward reserve, state
of charge.
µt R Community energy balance.
picomu,t R Entity energy balance.
ρinct R+ Symmetric reserve, upward re-
serve.
ρdect R+ Symmetric reserve, downward re-
serve.
σd,t R Dynamics of battery state of
charge.
ϕshed,t R+ Maximum load shedding.
ϕsted,t R+ Maximum steerable generation.
ϕchad,t R+ Maximum storage charging.
ϕdisd,t R+ Maximum storage discharging.
ϕsocUpd,t R+ Maximum battery state of
charge.
ϕsocLod,t R+ Minimum battery state of charge.
ϕeCapu,t R+ Maximum energy export to the
grid.
ϕiCapu,t R+ Maximum energy import from
the grid.
ϕpeakt R+ Community peak power.
ϕs+d,t R+ Storage upward reserve, power.
ϕs−d,t R+ Storage downward reserve,
power.
ζd R Final battery state of charge.
1. Introduction
The increasing penetration of distributed generation (DG)
from renewable energy sources and energy storage systems
in distribution networks paves the way to new market mod-
els that favor a local usage of the generated electricity [1].
In this context, microgrids are gaining increasing popularity
Public grid
Entity u
Storage GeneratorLoad
Local bus
Figure 1: Entity of a community, device types, and energy flows.
as an architecture capable of making a more efficient use of
resources at a local level [2], and maximizing the local con-
sumption of electricity generated in a distributed manner [3].
When interconnected to the public grid, microgrids may also
provide services, such as peak shaving and power balance.
The contribution of this paper focuses on community mi-
crogrids, where members of the community (termed entities
in the following) decide to pool their resources (generation,
load and/or storage devices) to reduce their costs, increase
their revenues, and achieve a more efficient use of their assets.
A schematic representation of an entity is shown in Fig. 1.
The entities of the community are assumed to be connected
to the same local bus, through which they exchange energy
among themselves and with the public grid. After introduc-
ing a conceptual architecture of the community microgrid,
this paper develops the model of an internal local market,
based on the marginal pricing scheme, whose aim is to max-
imize the social welfare of the community.
1.1. Related work
Microgrid energy markets provide small-scale prosumers
with a market platform to trade locally generated energy
within their community. In some cases, the trading takes
place without the need of central intermediaries. Blockchain-
based local energy trading is proposed in [4], where prosumers
can trade self-produced energy in a peer-to-peer fashion. A
case study based on a real community microgrid project in
Brooklyn is also reported. In [5], a non-cooperative game
arises from the transferrable payoff allocation mechanism de-
signed to aggregate renewable power producers in a two-
settlement power market.
In most cases, the internal community market is managed
by a third party. A coupled microgrid power and reserve ca-
pacity planning problem is considered in [6]. In the proposed
bilevel formulation, the upper level problem represents a mi-
crogrid planner whose goal is to minimize its planning and
operational cost, while the lower level problem represents a
distribution system operator (DSO), whose primary duty is
to ensure reliable power supply. In [7], a peer-to-peer energy
sharing microgrid model for photovoltaic prosumers is pro-
posed. A virtual entity, named energy sharing provider, co-
ordinates the sharing activities. An internal pricing system is
designed, where the community prices are heuristically deter-
mined, based on the proportion between supply and demand
in the energy sharing zone. Three potential market models
for prosumers, i.e., prosumer-to-grid integration, peer-to-peer
models, and community groups, are discussed in [8]. Different
decision making problems within a community of energy pro-
sumers are considered in [9], where a discussion on centralized
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and distributed control schemes is also provided. The con-
cept of transactive electricity grid is analyzed in [10], where
prosumers are actively engaged in the transaction of electri-
cal energy, and new operators can be present to provide and
manage innovative services.
Fairness is an important concept in microgrid energy mar-
kets, to sustain a long-lasting aggregation of different enti-
ties driven by self-interests. A definition of fairness borrowed
from the field of coalitional game theory is considered in [11].
A market with transferable payoffs is proposed, whose com-
petitive equilibrium offers an in the core allocation mecha-
nism for the prosumers in an aggregated microgrid. A mathe-
matical formulation for a fair benefit distribution among par-
ticipants in a microgrid is presented in [12], where a central
operator decides the best solution by using a Nash bargain-
ing model, assuming discrete price levels for market prices.
In [13], a distributed market structure is proposed, where all
prosumers are in charge of optimizing their assets individu-
ally. Optimality is achieved as prosumers are coordinated by
a non-profit virtual node, called community manager. Since
the latter is also envisaged as a guarantor of the common
goals within the community, assessment of fairness among
market participants plays a fundamental role.
Other contributions in the literature on prosumer commu-
nities focus on specific aspects, such as the integration of
energy storage, demand response and mixed energy types.
The role of storage devices in peer-to-peer communities is
addressed in [14], where the problems of determining the
value of storage, and the most suitable market configura-
tions, are considered. In particular, two market designs are
analysed. In the first one, storage devices are located at
the house level, while in the second, the storage is a cen-
tralized device at the community level. Similarly, the value
of storage units in a real community energy system is in-
vestigated in [15], by analysing the conditions under which
energy storage is valuable for a mix of local generation units
supplying heating and electric loads. Techno-economic anal-
yses of community energy storage for residential prosumers
with smart appliances are proposed in [16] and [17], where
economic indicators are evaluated under different scenarios.
A community-based microgrid model, integrating wind tur-
bines, photovoltaics and combined heat-and-power genera-
tion, is introduced in [18]. Reference [19] presents a hierarchi-
cal method for an integrated community energy system with
demand response and combined heat-and-power units. The
described approach is composed of a day-ahead scheduling
system and two-layers for intra-hour adjustments, with differ-
ent objectives representing the operating cost minimization
and the tie-line power smoothing. Pricing of co-generated
electricity and heat in local communities is also considered in
[20].
Notwithstanding, the problem of determining a market-
oriented price for the trades within a community microgrid
is still an open issue. This is the main thread motivating
the contribution of this paper. Moreover, the paper tries to
address existing gaps as concerns quantifying the monetary
value of different services used by the community (e.g., a
third-party operator managing the community market, and
storage services).
1.2. Paper contribution
The aim of this paper is to introduce a community micro-
grid conceptual architecture, with an internal market which
shares the benefits of the community among the participat-
ing entities, by ensuring that none of them is penalized with
respect to acting individually. The executed quantities and
the market prices are determined by applying a social welfare
maximization approach, within the marginal pricing frame-
work, which ensures the efficient allocation of resources [21]–
[25]. By enforcing a set of non-discriminatory sharing poli-
cies, the revenues from the community reserve and the com-
munity peak power costs are shared among the entities. As
a consequence, each entity can benefit from joining the com-
munity due to the following reasons:
• the more efficient allocation of resources, making it pos-
sible to trade energy at more favorable prices;
• the provision of reserve on aggregate basis, and
• the reduction of the peak power cost due to the netting
effect of the other participants.
Summarizing, the main novelties of this paper in the con-
text of community microgrids, are the following:
• the design of a local market for community microgrids,
where the prices are determined through a social wel-
fare maximization approach fulfilling the marginal pric-
ing framework;
• the introduction of a Pareto superior-type criterion to
guarantee non-penalizing conditions for the entities in
the community, thus stimulating participation on a vol-
untary basis;
• the proposal of a benevolent planner operating the com-
munity, who fairly shares the profits of the community
among the entities based on non-discriminatory rules;
• the possibility to appraise different services used by the
community, such as the storage and the community mi-
crogrid operator.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 describes the considered community microgrid archi-
tecture. Section 3 formalizes the proposed community mi-
crogrid framework as a bilevel model, and discusses different
strategies for its solution. Section 4 reports some toy ex-
amples to demonstrate the main features of the model. A
test case inspired by the MeryGrid project [26], a real pilot
project currently under implementation in Belgium, is also
presented. It shows the significant cost savings on a yearly
scale for the community members, achieved by the proposed
framework in a real world problem. Section 5 summarizes
the main findings, and highlights ideas for further work.
2. The community microgrid architecture
A community microgrid is a collection of entities that ex-
change energy and services according to the rules of the com-
munity. Each entity is characterized by its own generation,
load and/or storage devices, and is assumed to be connected
to the public grid through a local bus, as shown in Fig. 1. The
local bus belongs to the public grid. When several entities are
connected to the same local bus (see Fig. 2a), the community
microgrid is a virtual layer handling the energy flows between
entities, that do not cross the boundary of the local bus (see
Fig. 2b). In this setting, ecomu and i
com
u denote the energy
exported to and imported from the community by entity u,
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(a) Real energy flows
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(b) Virtual energy flows
Figure 2: Schematic representations of the entities and of the commu-
nity.
respectively1. These energy flows represent the additional
degrees of freedom offered by the community to the entities,
enabling them to exchange energy among themselves. Let-
ting egriu and i
gri
u be the energy exported to and imported from
the grid by entity u, respectively, the net energy flowing from
entity u to the local bus amounts to (egriu +e
com
u )−(igriu +icomu ).
Since the net energy flowing from the grid to the local bus
amounts to
∑
u∈U (i
gri
u −egriu ), where U is the set of all the en-
tities, it must hold that
∑
u∈U (i
com
u − ecomu ) = 0, correspond-
ing to the energy balance at the community level. Figure 2a
shows the actual energy flows in the considered distribution
system. It can be also useful to visualize the virtual energy
flows as shown in Fig. 2b, where the community is represented
as a fictitious layer connecting the entities.
Joining a community microgrid may bring several advan-
tages to its participants:
• energy exchanges within the community can be executed
at a price that is more advantageous than the external
grid price;
• reserve can be pooled over the entities, and exchanged
with the grid at the community level;
• the peak power penalty can be reduced, since the peak
to be penalized is the peak of the community, rather
than the sum of the peaks of the single entities, taken
individually.
To achieve the aforementioned benefits, this paper focuses
on the operational planning stage that optimizes day-ahead
decisions with time periods of ∆T hours, given the grid energy
1For the sake of simplicity, we omit for now the time index, see the
Nomenclature.
prices, and the consumption and generation forecasts of the
entities. An operator manages the community to maximize
its social welfare, by optimizing the energy flows and the
interactions among the entities and with the public grid. The
operator must be contractually bound to the DSO, and its
perimeter must be clearly defined. It must also be trusted
by, and be contractually bound to, the community entities.
The latter pay a fee to the operator for the remuneration of
its activity.
It is stressed that, when entities aggregate in a community,
the peak power penalty, which remunerates the DSO for the
capacity of the public grid, is applied to the aggregate net en-
ergy flow
∑
u∈U (i
gri
u − egriu ). In this way, a single entity could
see a decrease of its peak power costs, even if it does not
lower its individual peak. However, adopting a peak penalty
scheme of this type at the community level, would likely force
the DSO to increase the peak penalty tariff. This, in turn,
should incentivize community members to decrease and to
desynchronize their peak power consumptions, which trans-
lates into lesser reinforcement costs for the DSO. Another
positive impact of the community microgrids for the DSOs
is that the coordinated optimization and control of several
entities offer a simpler interface, e.g., for the procurement of
flexibility services.
For the energy exchanged with the external grid, entities
are subject to the same mechanism as if they would not be
part of a community (electricity tariffs, fees, taxes, etc.). In
practice, this requires a correction of the data communicated
to operators and retailers for invoicing purposes. Indeed, as-
suming two meters per entity, the one will measure the energy
flowing from the entity to the local bus, namely egriu +e
com
u , the
other will measure the energy flowing from the local bus to
the entity, namely igriu + i
com
u . Both measurements should be
corrected with the information provided by the community
microgrid operator (in particular, with the internal energy
flows ecomu and i
com
u ) to obtain the correct values e
gri
u and i
gri
u
to be invoiced to entity u.
3. The optimization model
This section describes the optimization model designed to
solve the community microgrid market clearing problem, and
to share the corresponding benefits among the entities of the
community. The problem is formulated in Section 3.1 as a
nonlinear bilevel model. Practical aspects on how to tackle
the solution of the proposed bilevel model are discussed in
Section 3.2.
3.1. The bilevel model
A bilevel model is a mathematical program composed of
two nested optimization problems, termed upper and lower
level [27]. Formally,
max
x∈X
F (x, y∗) (1)
s.t. y∗ ∈ arg max
y∈Y
f(y;x) , (2)
where F and f are the objective functions of the upper and
lower level problems (1) and (2), respectively. In general, the
optimizer y∗ and the feasible set Y of the lower level depend
on the unknown x of the upper level. In turn, the feasible set
X of the upper level may depend on y∗.
Historically, bilevel programming was used in the field of
game theory to cast Stackelberg games [28]. These problems
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represent a class of non-cooperative leader-follower games,
where the upper and lower level objective functions are differ-
ent, and represent conflicting interests. Conversely, in power
system economics [29, 30, 31, 32], bilevel programming is typ-
ically used to access dual variables, which represent market
prices within the marginal pricing framework [21]. This is
the main reason to adopt a bilevel formulation in this paper.
In the proposed bilevel model, the lower level solves the com-
munity microgrid market clearing problem, by determining:
• the executed quantities,
• the community prices,
• the community symmetric reserve, and
• the community peak power,
with the aim of maximizing the social welfare of the com-
munity. Then, the role of the upper level is to share among
the entities the profits of the community, by ensuring that
no entity is penalized with respect to acting individually. In-
deed, a community is composed of several entities driven by
self-interests. In order to achieve a long-lasting community
microgrid, each entity should be stimulated to participate in
the community on a voluntary basis. This is achieved by
enforcing the condition
Ju ≥ JSUu ∀u ∈ U , (3)
where JSUu is the optimal profit of entity u when acting in-
dividually, while Ju is the profit of entity u within the com-
munity. As a consequence, the upper level can be seen as a
benevolent planner, that manages the community microgrid
in the best interest of all the participants. If at least one
inequality in (3) is satisfied strictly, the state of the commu-
nity is termed Pareto superior to the state when entities act
individually [23].
3.1.1. Lower level problem
This section describes the lower level problem (2) of the
proposed bilevel model. The vector y of decision variables
is composed of the community symmetric reserve rsym, the
community peak power p, the executed quantities egriu,t, i
gri
u,t,
ecomu,t , i
com
u,t , the community prices pi
com
u,t , the upward and down-
ward power reserves rs+d,t , r
s−
d,t , the fractions a
she
d,t , a
ste
d,t of shed
demand and steered generation, the fractions of charging and
discharging power achad,t , a
dis
d,t, and the storage states of charge
sd,t.
The objective function f is defined as follows:
−
∑
u∈U
∑
t∈T
( ∑
d∈Dsheu
pished,t C
she
d,t ∆Ta
she
d,t +
∑
d∈Dsteu
pisted,tP
ste
d,t ∆Ta
ste
d,t
− piegrt egriu,t + piigrt igriu,t + γcom
(
ecomu,t + i
com
u,t
)
+
∑
d∈Dstou
γstod ∆T
(
P dη
cha
d a
cha
d,t +
P d
ηdisd
adisd,t
))
+ piresrsym
− pipeakp. (4)
It represents the social welfare of the community, composed
of three terms. The first term is the summation −∑u∈U (. . .),
which takes into account different revenues and costs related
to energy flows2: the costs of shed demand and steered gener-
ation, the revenues from selling energy to the grid, the costs of
purchasing energy from the grid, the fees paid to the commu-
nity microgrid operator, and the costs for using storage. The
second term is piresrsym, representing the revenue collected
by the community for providing reserve to the grid. Finally,
the third term is the cost −pipeakp, paid for the community
peak power p over the time horizon T .
The feasible set Y of the lower level problem (2) is defined
by different sets of constraints. In the following, a variable
between square brackets represents the dual variable of the
corresponding constraint. The first set of constraints bounds
some of the lower level decision variables:
asted,t ≤ 1 ∀d ∈ Dste,∀t ∈ T [ϕsted,t ≥ 0] (5)
ashed,t ≤ 1 ∀d ∈ Dshe,∀t ∈ T [ϕshed,t ≥ 0] (6)
achad,t ≤ 1 ∀d ∈ Dsto,∀t ∈ T [ϕchad,t ≥ 0] (7)
adisd,t ≤ 1 ∀d ∈ Dsto,∀t ∈ T [ϕdisd,t ≥ 0] (8)
sd,t ≤ Sd ∀d ∈ Dsto,∀t ∈ T [ϕsocUpd,t ≥ 0] (9)
− sd,t ≤ −Sd ∀d ∈ Dsto,∀t ∈ T . [ϕsocLod,t ≥ 0] (10)
In particular, constraints (9) and (10) impose that the state
of charge of each storage unit cannot exceed its upper and
lower bounds Sd and Sd.
The second set of constraints is related to energy flows
inside and outside the community.
egriu,t − igriu,t + ecomu,t − icomu,t
−∆T
( ∑
d∈Dnstu
P nstd,t +
∑
d∈Dsteu
asted,tP
ste
d,t
)
+ ∆T
( ∑
d∈Dnflu
Cnfld,t +
∑
d∈Dsheu
(1− ashed,t )Cshed,t
)
+ ∆T
∑
d∈Dstou
(
P da
cha
d,t − P dadisd,t
)
= 0
∀u ∈ U ,∀t ∈ T [picomu,t ∈ R] (11)∑
u∈U
(
icomu,t − ecomu,t
)
= 0 ∀t ∈ T [µt ∈ R] (12)
(egriu,t − igriu,t)/∆T ≤ Ecapu,t ∀u ∈ U ,∀t ∈ T [ϕeCapu,t ≥ 0]
(13)
(igriu,t − egriu,t)/∆T ≤ Icapu,t ∀u ∈ U ,∀t ∈ T [ϕiCapu,t ≥ 0] (14)∑
u∈U
(
igriu,t − egriu,t
)
/∆T ≤ p ∀t ∈ T . [ϕpeakt ≥ 0] (15)
Constraint (11) defines the energy balance for each entity.
The positive terms in the left-hand side of the equation rep-
resent the energy exported by the entity to the grid and the
rest of the community, as well as the energy consumption of
the loads connected to the entity, including the charging of
storage units. On the other hand, the negative terms repre-
sent the energy imported by the entity from the grid and the
rest of the community, as well as the energy provided by the
generators connected to the entity, including the discharging
of storage units. It is stressed that the dual variable picomu,t
of constraint (11) has an important economic interpretation
within the marginal pricing framework [21, 22]. Indeed, being
2In (4), revenues are positive quantities, while costs are negative
quantities.
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picomu,t the dual variable of the energy balance constraint for
entity u, in the proposed formulation it represents the market
price at which entity u exchanges energy with the commu-
nity at time t [33]. Constraint (12) imposes the balance of
the energy flows within the community at each time period.
Constraints (13) and (14) set limits to the net energy ex-
ported to and imported from the grid by each entity at each
time period. Finally, constraint (15) determines the commu-
nity peak power p. The community peak power p is defined
as the maximum of the net power imported from the grid by
the community over the time horizon T . In this respect, the
simultaneous import and export of different entities may have
the effect of making the community peak power lower than
the sum of the peaks of the entities when acting individually.
Remark 1. At the optimum of the lower level problem, egriu,t
and igriu,t, as well as e
com
u,t and i
com
u,t , cannot be simultaneously
greater than 0. In other words, no simultaneous export to
and import from the grid can occur for entity u over a given
time period. The same holds for the energy exported to and
imported from the community by entity u. Both results are
shown in Appendix C.2. 
The following set of constraints describes the dynamics of
the state of charge for each storage unit:
sd,1 −∆T
(
P dη
cha
d a
cha
d,1 −
P d
ηdisd
adisd,1
)
= Sinitd
∀d ∈ Dsto [σd,1 ∈ R] (16)
sd,t − sd,t−1 −∆T
(
P dη
cha
d a
cha
d,t −
P d
ηdisd
adisd,t
)
= 0
∀d ∈ Dsto, t ∈ {2, . . . , T} [σd,t ∈ R] (17)
sd,T = S
end
d ∀d ∈ Dsto [ζd ∈ R] (18)
In (16) and (18), Sinitd and S
end
d are given parameters, repre-
senting the initial and final state of charge of storage unit d,
respectively. Notice that the dynamics in (16) and (17) take
into account the charging and discharging efficiencies ηchad
and ηdisd of the storage units.
The last set of constraints defines the community symmet-
ric reserve rsym:
rs+d,t ≤
(sd,t − Sd) ηdisd
∆T
∀d ∈ Dsto,∀t ∈ T [κs+d,t ≥ 0] (19)
rs+d,t ≤ P d(1− adisd,t) ∀d ∈ Dsto,∀t ∈ T [ϕs+d,t ≥ 0] (20)
rs−d,t ≤
(
Sd − sd,t
)
ηchad ∆T
∀d ∈ Dsto,∀t ∈ T [κs−d,t ≥ 0] (21)
rs−d,t ≤ P d(1− achad,t ) ∀d ∈ Dsto,∀t ∈ T [ϕs−d,t ≥ 0] (22)
rsym ≤
∑
u∈U
( ∑
d∈Dstou
rs+d,t +
∑
d∈Dsteu
P sted,t (1− asted,t)
+
∑
d∈Dsheu
Cshed,t (1− ashed,t )
)
∀t ∈ T [ρinct ≥ 0]
(23)
rsym ≤
∑
u∈U
( ∑
d∈Dstou
rs−d,t +
∑
d∈Dsteu
P sted,t a
ste
d,t
+
∑
d∈Dsheu
Cshed,t a
she
d,t
)
∀t ∈ T [ρdect ≥ 0] (24)
The upward reserve rs+d,t provided by storage unit d at time t
is bounded by both its current state of charge sd,t through
(19), and the remaining available discharging power through
(20). Inequalities (21) and (22) enforce similar constraints to
the downward reserve provided by each storage unit. Finally,
constraints (23) and (24) define the community symmetric
reserve as the minimum symmetric reserve available from the
community over the time horizon T . Notice that the reserve
is provided not only by storage units, but also by steerable
generators and sheddable loads. Other reserve schemes can
be modeled, as long as the corresponding constraints remain
linear in the decision variables of the lower level problem.
Summarizing, the lower level problem solves the commu-
nity microgrid market clearing problem by maximizing the
objective function (4), subject to the constraints (5)-(24).
Notice that this is a linear program. By applying standard
tools of duality theory in linear programming, the constraints
and the objective function of the corresponding dual problem
are derived in Appendix A and Appendix B. Notice that
solving the dual problem gives access to the community prices
picomu,t , that are a key outcome of the market clearing process.
In the following, the value of the objective function (4) at the
optimum of the lower level problem will be denoted by J*.
An important result that can be obtained from duality re-
lations, is the following identity, which holds at the optimum
of the lower level problem (see Appendix C.1 for the proof):
γcom
∑
u∈U
∑
t∈T
(
ecomu,t + i
com
u,t
)
= −
∑
u∈U
∑
t∈T
picomu,t
(
ecomu,t − icomu,t
)
.
(25)
Intuitively, this can be explained because the monetary flows
within the community offset each other, except for the part
collected by the community operator, represented by its fee.
3.1.2. Upper level problem
The role of the upper level is to share among the entities
the optimal profit J* of the community, while ensuring that
no entity is penalized with respect to acting individually. To
do this, we let
Ju = J
energy
u + J
reserve
u + J
peak
u (26)
be the total profit of entity u within the considered com-
munity microgrid framework. In (26), the quantity Jenergyu
takes into account the revenues and costs for entity u related
to energy flows:
Jenergyu =
= −
∑
t∈T
( ∑
d∈Dsheu
pished,t C
she
d,t ∆Ta
she
d,t +
∑
d∈Dsteu
pisted,tP
ste
d,t ∆Ta
ste
d,t
− piegrt egriu,t + piigrt igriu,t − picomu,t
(
ecomu,t − icomu,t
)
+
∑
d∈Dstou
γstod ∆T
(
P dη
cha
d a
cha
d,t +
P d
ηdisd
adisd,t
))
. (27)
Notice that the energy exchanges with the community, ecomu,t
and icomu,t , are valued at the price pi
com
u,t , i.e., the market-
clearing price for entity u at time t. Moreover, in (26), J reserveu
represents the revenue ascribed to entity u for its contribu-
tion to reserve, and Jpeaku is the portion assigned to entity u
of the cost paid by the community for the peak power. These
quantities are defined as follows:
J reserveu = pi
resrsymu (28)
Jpeaku = −pipeakpu, (29)
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where rsymu ≥ 0 and pu ≥ 0 are the contributions to com-
munity reserve rsym and peak power p assigned to entity u,
satisfying the constraints:
rsym =
∑
u∈U
rsymu (30)
p =
∑
u∈U
pu. (31)
By summing (26) over all entities u, and exploiting (25), (30)
and (31), it is straightforward to obtain the identity:
J* =
∑
u∈U
Ju, (32)
which shows that the proposed framework totally shares the
optimal profit J* of the community among the entities.
In order to ensure that no entity is penalized with respect
to acting individually, for each entity u the quantity Ju in
(26) has to be compared with the value JSUu , representing
the maximum profit that the entity would achieve over the
time horizon T without joining the community. This value
is computed for each entity by solving an optimization prob-
lem derived from the lower level problem of the community.
Specifically, in (4)-(24), all summations with respect to u ∈ U
are removed, the index u is fixed and refers to the entity con-
sidered, the energy exchanges ecomu,t and i
com
u,t with the com-
munity are set to zero, and rsym and p are replaced with
rsymu and pu. Given the lower bounds J
SU
u for all entities, the
requirement that all entities should benefit from joining the
community, is translated into the following condition:
Ju ≥ JSUu + α, ∀u ∈ U , (33)
where α ≥ 0 is a slack variable to be maximized. Notice that
maximizing α corresponds to maximize minu
(
Ju−JSUu
)
, i.e.,
the minimum profit improvement achieved by all the entities
u of the community. Since α ≥ 0, condition (33) generalizes
condition (3).
In order to satisfy (33), the upper level problem may act
on the terms J reserveu and J
peak
u by deciding the quantities
rsymu and pu, subject to (30) and (31). Conversely, the term
Jenergyu of (26) is fixed by the considered solution of the lower
level problem. Notice, however, that the lower level problem
may have multiple solutions, and the upper level problem
explores all of them.
Additional constraints are introduced to define, together
with (30), the reserve sharing policy enforced by the commu-
nity microgrid operator:
rincu,t =
∑
d∈Dstou
rs+d,t +
∑
d∈Dsteu
P sted,t (1− asted,t)
+
∑
d∈Dsheu
Cshed,t (1− ashed,t ) ∀u ∈ U ,∀t ∈ T (34)
rdecu,t =
∑
d∈Dstou
rs−d,t +
∑
d∈Dsteu
P sted,t a
ste
d,t
+
∑
d∈Dsheu
Cshed,t a
she
d,t ∀u ∈ U ,∀t ∈ T (35)
rsymu ≤
1
2
(
rdecu,t + r
inc
u,t
) ∀u ∈ U ,∀t ∈ T . (36)
Constraints (34) and (35) define the actual amount of upward
and downward reserve provided by each entity u at time pe-
riod t. From (23) and (24), it holds that rsym ≤ ∑u∈U rincu,t
and rsym ≤∑u∈U rdecu,t for all t ∈ T . Constraint (36) imposes
that no entity is accounted for more than its average reserve
contribution. This represents a possible non-discriminatory
sharing policy rule, though more involved rules could be de-
fined.
Summarizing, in the proposed formulation, the upper level
problem (1) is an optimization problem in the decision vari-
ables α, rincu,t , r
dec
u,t , r
sym
u and pu, with feasible set X defined by
the constraints (30)-(36), and α ≥ 0. The objective function
F of the upper level coincides with the slack variable α.
3.2. Solution strategies
In the proposed bilevel formulation, the lower level problem
is a linear program which does not depend on the decision
variables of the upper level problem. Moreover, for a fixed
solution of the lower level problem, the upper level problem is
also a linear program. This implies that, if the solution of the
lower level problem is unique, the bilevel model can be solved
very efficiently as the cascade of two linear programs, one
corresponding to the lower level, and the other corresponding
to the upper level. Notice that uniqueness of the solution of
the lower level problem can be checked a priori via standard
tools in linear programming [34].
If the lower level solution is not unique, the bilevel problem
can be tackled by recasting it as a single optimization pro-
gram. The resulting model is nonlinear, due to the bilinear
terms picomu,t e
com
u,t and pi
com
u,t i
com
u,t appearing in (27). The recast-
ing as a single optimization program relies on the fact that the
lower level problem is a linear program, which can be replaced
with its first-order necessary and sufficient Karush-Kuhn-
Tucker conditions. Furthermore, the strong duality holds
for a feasible linear program, and implies the complementary
slackness [35, 36]. In order to avoid further nonlinearities
due to complementary slackness conditions, the strong dual-
ity can thus be employed. Consequently, the bilevel model
introduced in Section 3.1 can be recast as a single nonlinear
optimization program composed of the following parts:
1. the objective function α of the upper level (to be maxi-
mized),
2. the upper-level constraints (30)-(36), and α ≥ 0,
3. the lower-level constraints (5)-(24),
4. the dual constraints of the lower level problem, reported
in Appendix A, and
5. the strong duality condition for the lower level problem,
described in Appendix B.
Notice that the lower level problem of the proposed bilevel
model is always feasible, being feasible the decoupled solution
where energy exchanges among the entities are set to zero.
This is a consequence of the fact that the problems solved for
each entity to compute the lower bounds JSUu , are assumed
to be feasible.
4. Numerical results
Numerical results are divided in two categories. In Sec-
tion 4.1, we report results on illustrative cases to demon-
strate the proposed approach and the soundness of the so-
lutions found. Then, in Section 4.2, we report a real test
case to show the significant cost savings on a yearly scale for
the community members, achieved by the proposed frame-
work in a problem of real size. In all the tests, unless stated
otherwise:
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Public grid
Entity 2Entity 1
Community
2 kWh
icom1 = 3
picom1 = 0.055
egri2 = 2
ecom2 = 3
picom2 = 0.035
Local bus
(a) Energy flows and prices
Entity Com 1 2
J 0.01 -0.165 0.175
JSU -0.725 -0.9 0.175
Jenergy 0.01 -0.165 0.175
JSU,energy -0.275 -0.45 0.175
Jpeak 0.0 0.0 0.0
JSU,peak -0.45 -0.45 0.0
(b) Summary of costs (< 0) and revenues (> 0)
Figure 3: Results of the example of Section 4.1.1.
• Sinitd = Sendd = 0, ∀d ∈ Dsto;
• Ecapu,t =∞ and Icapu,t =∞, ∀u ∈ U ;
• entities can buy energy from, and sell energy to the grid
at prices piigrt = 0.15 e/kWh and pi
egr
t = 0.035 e/kWh,
respectively;
• we check a posteriori that at each time step there is
no simultaneous charging and discharging of any storage
device.
All the results have been obtained using Pyomo 5.5 [37], and
Cplex 12.8 [38].
4.1. Illustrative examples
In the examples of this section, the duration of a time pe-
riod is ∆T = 1 h. Each entity is composed of only one device.
For this reason, D∗u = {u}, where the superscript ∗ stands for
the type of the device connected to entity u (‘nfl’, ‘nst’, ‘she’,
‘ste’, or ‘sto’). In the frames of Figs. 3-8 showing energy
flows and prices, the time index is removed from notation,
because each frame refers to a single time period. In the
tables of the same figures, the symbols in the first column
should be intended with the subscript u, when referred to
entity u. Similar to (26), JSU,energyu , J
SU,peak
u and J
SU,reserve
u
denote the energy, peak and reserve component of JSUu . On
the other hand, the values in the second column, referred to
the community, are the sums of the values referred to the
entities along the same row.
4.1.1. Excess of local generation, one time period
The first example considers two entities, and encompasses
only one time period (t = 1). Entity 1 is a non-flexible load
with Cnfl1,1 = 3 kW, while entity 2 is a non-steerable gen-
erator with P nst2,1 = 5 kW. Unitary peak power price and
community operator fee are set to pipeak = 0.15 e/kW and
Public grid
Entity 2Entity 1
Community
3 kWh
igri1 = 3
icom1 = 5
picom1 = 0.3
ecom2 = 5
picom2 = 0.28
Local bus
(a) Energy flows and prices
Entity Com 1 2
J -1.0 -1.95 0.95
JSU -2.225 -2.4 0.175
Jenergy -0.55 -1.95 1.4
JSU,energy -1.025 -1.2 0.175
Jpeak -0.45 0.0 -0.45
JSU,peak -1.2 -1.2 0.0
(b) Summary of costs (< 0) and revenues (> 0)
Figure 4: Results of the example of Section 4.1.2.
γcom = 0.01 e/kWh. Storage and reserve provision are not
present in this example.
Figure 3 shows the optimal solution, where entity 2 satis-
fies the demand of entity 1 through the community (ecom2,1 =
icom1,1 = 3 kWh). The excess of generation is sold to the grid
(egri2,1 = 2 kWh) at price pi
egr
1 = 0.035 e/kWh, which sets the
community market price picom2,1 for entity 2. Indeed, the main
grid represents the marginal unit, and its bid price defines
the local market price for that entity. In this way, entity 2
does not improve its revenue as compared to acting individ-
ually, see Fig. 3b. Concerning entity 1, it buys energy from
entity 2 at price picom1,1 = 0.055 e/kWh, which includes the
market price picom2,1 of entity 2, and the fee γ
com due to the
community microgrid operator, collected both on import icom1,1
and export ecom2,1 . This reflects the following relation, which is
derived from (C.1) and (C.2) for an entity u with ecomu,t > 0,
and an entity u′ with icomu′,t > 0:
picomu′,t = pi
com
u,t + 2γ
com. (37)
From Fig. 3b, it is apparent that the reduction of the costs
for entity 1 as compared to acting individually, is due to
two reasons. First, it buys energy from entity 2 at a price
which is lower than the selling price of the grid. Second,
it avoids to pay the peak penalty, since the community is
globally exporting energy to the grid.
4.1.2. Shortage of local generation, one time period
The setup of this example is similar to that in Section 4.1.1,
with the only difference that entity 1 is now characterized by
a consumption Cnfl1,1 = 8 kW.
Figure 4 shows the optimal solution. Entity 1 satisfies its
demand buying energy from both entity 2 (ecom2,1 = i
com
1,1 =
5 kWh) and the grid (igri1,1 = 3 kWh). Since the grid supplies
energy to entity 1, it acts as the marginal producer, setting
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Public grid
Entity 2 Entity 3Entity 1
Community
1.49 kWh
egri2 = 1.49
ecom2 = 3.51
picom2 = 0.035
icom3 = 3.51
picom3 = 0.055
Local bus
(a) Energy flows and prices, time period 1
Public grid
Entity 2 Entity 3Entity 1
Community
icom1 = 3
picom1 = 0.169
ecom3 = 3
picom3 = 0.149
Local bus
(b) Energy flows and prices, time period 2
Entity Com 1 2 3
J -0.331 -0.506 0.175 0.0
JSU -0.725 -0.9 0.175 0.0
Jenergy -0.331 -0.506 0.175 0.0
JSU,energy -0.275 -0.45 0.175 0.0
Jpeak 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
JSU,peak -0.45 -0.45 0.0 0.0
(c) Summary of costs (< 0) and revenues (> 0)
Figure 5: Results of the example of Section 4.1.3.
the community market price picom1,1 for entity 1 as
picom1,1 =
pipeak
∆T
+ piigr1 . (38)
This can be derived from the complementary slackness con-
ditions corresponding to the dual constraints (A.10) and
(A.14), being igri1,1 > 0 and p > 0. It is interesting to ob-
serve in Fig. 4b that the peak power cost of the community
is totally assigned to entity 2, even though entity 2 is not
importing energy from the grid. This is the effect of the op-
timization in the upper level, which, among all the feasible
peak sharing policies, selects the one maximizing the mini-
mum gain of the two entities.
4.1.3. Storage, two time periods, no shared peak
This example encompasses two time periods (t = 1, 2).
Entity 1 is a non-flexible load with Cnfl1,1 = 0 kW and
Cnfl1,2 = 3 kW. Entity 2 is a non-steerable generator with
P nst2,1 = 5 kW and P
nst
2,2 = 0 kW. Different from previous
examples, a third entity is added, characterized by a stor-
age device with parameters S3 = 12 kWh, S3 = 0 kWh,
P 3 = P 3 = 6 kW, η
cha
3 = 0.9 and η
dis
3 = 0.95. The uni-
tary cost for battery usage is γsto3 = 0.04 e/kWh. All the
other prices and fees remain unchanged with respect to Sec-
tion 4.1.1. Reserve provision is not present in this example.
Figure 5 shows the optimal solution. At time period t = 1,
entity 2 sells a part of its production to entity 3 (ecom2,1 =
icom3,1 = 3.51 kWh), charging the storage up to a state of
charge that is just enough so that entity 3 can fully satisfy
the demand of entity 1 at time period t = 2 (icom1,2 = e
com
3,2 =
3 kWh), taking into account the round-trip efficiency of the
storage (ecom3,2 = η
cha
3 η
dis
3 i
com
3,1 ). Recall that S
init
3 = S
end
3 =
0 kWh. Concerning the market prices, at time period t = 1
we are in a situation similar to that of Section 4.1.1. The
grid is the marginal unit, whose bid price defines the local
market price for entity 2 (picom2,1 = pi
egr
1 = 0.035 e/kWh).
Then, the market price picom3,1 for entity 3 is determined by
the relation (37) with t = 1, u = 2 and u′ = 3. On the other
hand, at time period t = 2, the market price picom3,2 for entity 3
is determined by replacing d = 3 in the following relation:
picomd,t+1 =
picomd,t
ηchad η
dis
d
+ 2
γstod
ηdisd
, (39)
which is obtained from the complementary slackness condi-
tions corresponding to the dual constraints (A.3)-(A.6), for a
storage d not providing reserve, charged at time period t, and
discharged at time period t+ 1. Notice that (39) is the min-
imum selling price that allows the storage unit to fully cover
the costs for buying energy (including efficiency losses) and
for its usage. Finally, the market price picom1,2 for entity 1 is
determined by the relation (37) with t = 2, u = 3 and u′ = 1.
The resulting price picom1,2 = 0.169 e/kWh at which entity 1
buys energy from the community, is greater than the price
piigr2 = 0.15 e/kWh at which it can buy energy from the grid.
However, buying energy from the community avoids entity 1
to pay the penalty for the peak power (see Fig. 5c), with a
significant cost saving.
Remark 2. If the maximum capacity of the storage device
is reduced to S3 = 2 kWh, the storage is fully charged in
period 1, namely s3,1 = 2 kWh. As a consequence, con-
straint (9) is active, i.e., the storage is a scarce resource.
Due to (A.3)-(A.6), and considering that ϕsocUpd,t ≥ 0, the ad-
ditional term
ϕsocUpd,t
ηdisd
appears in the right-hand side of (39).
Thus, the storage gains 0.159 e by participating in the com-
munity. Notice, however, that the decrease of the storage
capacity narrows the feasible set of the optimization problem,
causing a reduction of the overall cost savings for the com-
munity.
4.1.4. Storage, two time periods, shared peak
The setup is similar to that of Section 4.1.3, but in this
case pipeak = 0.2 e/kW, Cnfl1,2 = 5 kW and P
nst
2,1 = 3 kW.
Figure 6 shows the optimal solution. The production of
entity 2 at time period t = 1 is not enough to satisfy the
demand of entity 1 at time period t = 2. Hence, missing
energy must be bought from the grid. In order to reduce the
peak power cost, intuition suggests to buy the same amount
of energy from the grid in both periods: in time period t = 1
the energy imported from the grid is stored in the battery,
while in time period t = 2 it directly supplies entity 1. Writ-
ing down the energy balance under these constraints, it is
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Public grid
Entity 2 Entity 3Entity 1
Community
1.31 kWh
ecom2 = 3
picom2 = 0.162
igri3 = 1.31
icom3 = 3
picom3 = 0.182
Local bus
(a) Energy flows and prices, time period 1
Public grid
Entity 2 Entity 3Entity 1
Community
1.31 kWh
igri1 = 1.31
icom1 = 3.69
picom1 = 0.318
ecom3 = 3.69
picom3 = 0.298
Local bus
(b) Energy flows and prices, time period 2
Entity Com 1 2 3
J -1.101 -1.63 0.487 0.0426
JSU -1.645 -1.75 0.105 0.0
Jenergy -0.838 -1.368 0.487 0.0426
JSU,energy -0.645 -0.75 0.105 0.0
Jpeak -0.263 -0.263 0.0 0.0
JSU,peak -1.0 -1.0 0.0 0.0
(c) Summary of costs (< 0) and revenues (> 0)
Figure 6: Results of the example of Section 4.1.4.
straightforward to obtain
igri3,1 = i
gri
1,2 =
Cnfl1,2 − ηcha3 ηdis3 P nst2,1
1 + ηcha3 η
dis
3
' 1.31 kWh, (40)
which coincides with the solution found by the optimization
model. To understand how the market prices are formed,
notice that picom2,1 and pi
com
3,1 satisfy (37) for u = 2, u
′ = 3 and
t = 1, picom3,1 and pi
com
3,2 satisfy (39) for d = 3 and t = 1, and
picom3,2 and pi
com
1,2 satisfy (37) for u = 3, u
′ = 1 and t = 2.
Moreover, by using (A.10) and (A.14), it holds that:
picom3,1 + pi
com
1,2 =
pipeak
∆T
+ piigr1 + pi
igr
2 , (41)
which generalizes (38) to the case of two entities importing
energy from the grid, the one at time t = 1, and the other
at time t = 2. We therefore have a system of four linear
equations in the four unknowns picom2,1 , pi
com
3,1 , pi
com
1,2 and pi
com
3,2 ,
which admits the unique solution reported in Fig. 6. It is
apparent in Fig. 6c that all the three entities benefit from
the market solution found at the community level.
Public grid
Entity 2 Entity 3Entity 1
Community
icom2 = 3
picom2 = 0.27
ecom3 = 3
picom3 = 0.25
Local bus
(a) Energy flows and prices
Entity Com 1 2 3
J -1.31 -0.5 -0.81 0.0
JSU -1.4 -0.5 -0.9 0.0
Jenergy -1.31 -0.5 -0.81 0.0
JSU,energy -0.95 -0.5 -0.45 0.0
Jpeak 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
JSU,peak -0.45 0.0 -0.45 0.0
(b) Summary of costs (< 0) and revenues (> 0)
Figure 7: Results of the example of Section 4.1.5.
4.1.5. Flexible demand and generation, one time period
This example encompasses only one time period (t = 1).
Entities 1 and 2 are sheddable loads with Cshe1,1 = 5 kW and
Cshe2,1 = 3 kW, respectively. The corresponding load shedding
costs amount to pishe1,1 = 0.1 and pi
she
2,1 = 0.4 e/kWh. Entity 3
is a steerable generator with P ste3,1 = 4 kW, and generation
cost piste3,1 = 0.25 e/kWh. All the other prices and fees remain
unchanged with respect to Section 4.1.1. Storage and reserve
are not present in this example.
Figure 7 shows the optimal solution. When entities act
individually, entity 1 sheds the whole demand, because its
cost of load shedding is less than the cost of buying energy
from the grid, including the peak power cost, namely
pipeak
∆T
+ piigr1 = 0.3 e/kWh. (42)
On the other hand, entity 2 consumes its maximum power,
because its cost of load shedding is greater than (42). En-
tity 3 does not produce, because its generation cost is not
compensated by the price at which it may sell energy to the
grid, i.e., piegr1 = 0.035 e/kWh. When the entities are within
the community, the best option for entity 1 is still to shed
the whole demand, while entity 2 is fully supplied by entity 3
through the community. In this way, peak power costs are
avoided. The market price picom3,1 for entity 3 (which is the
marginal unit in this case) coincides with its generation cost
piste3,1, i.e., the minimum price at which entity 3 does not incur
in losses. The market price for entity 2 is determined by (37)
for u = 3, u′ = 2 and t = 1. It can be observed in Fig. 7b
that the gain of the community entirely corresponds to the
gain of entity 2.
4.1.6. Steerable generation, one time period, reserve
This example encompasses only one time period (t = 1).
Entity 1 is a non-flexible load with Cnfl1,1 = 10 kW. Entities 2
and 3 are steerable generators with P ste2,1 = 5 kW and P
ste
3,1 =
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Public grid
Entity 2 Entity 3Entity 1
Community
icom1 = 10
picom1 = 0.245
ecom2 = 5
picom2 = 0.225
ecom3 = 5
picom3 = 0.225
Local bus
(a) Energy flows and prices
Entity Com 1 2 3
J 0.575 -2.45 1.303 1.722
JSU -1.4125 -3.0 0.5375 1.05
Jenergy -0.425 -2.45 1.025 1.0
JSU,energy -1.4125 -1.5 0.0375 0.05
Jpeak 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
JSU,peak -1.5 -1.5 0.0 0.0
J reserve 1.0 0.0 0.278 0.722
JSU,reserve 1.5 0.0 0.5 1.0
(b) Summary of costs (< 0) and revenues (> 0)
Figure 8: Results of the example of Section 4.1.6.
10 kW, respectively. Both generators have relatively low gen-
eration costs, namely piste2,1 = 0.02 and pi
ste
3,1 = 0.025 e/kWh.
Reserve price is set to pires = 0.2 e/kW. All the other prices
and fees remain unchanged with respect to Section 4.1.1.
Storage is not present in this example.
Figure 8 shows the optimal solution. Given the high re-
serve price and the low price at which energy is sold to the
grid, when they act individually, entities 2 and 3 produce at
half of their capacity, thus maximizing the revenue from sym-
metric reserve provision. On the other hand, when they are
within the community, suitable pricing of energy exchanges
makes selling energy to the grid no more convenient for en-
tities 2 and 3. According to the marginal pricing framework,
for both entities the market price would be the cost of provid-
ing one additional unit of energy. In this case, it is given by
the sum of the corresponding generation cost, and the miss-
ing profit from providing reserve (i.e., the opportunity cost).
Moreover, for two entities both exporting energy to the com-
munity, the market prices are equal, as follows from the com-
plementary slackness conditions corresponding to the dual
constraints (A.7). Since piste3,1 > pi
ste
2,1, entity 3 is the marginal
unit, and defines the price. Indeed, the optimization returns
picom2,1 = pi
com
3,1 =
pires
∆T
+ piste3,1 = 0.225 e/kWh. (43)
At this price, it is convenient for entity 2 to steer all its
available power, while entity 3 produces at half of its capacity,
still guaranteeing its maximum amount of symmetric reserve.
The market price for entity 1 is determined by (37) for u = 2
(or u = 3), u′ = 1 and t = 1. It can be observed in Fig. 8b
that all the three entities benefit from the market solution
found at the community level. Notice that the community
assigns a portion of the revenue from reserve provision also
to entity 2, although entity 2 does not actually contribute to
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Figure 9: Costs for the community.
symmetric reserve (it produces at its maximum capacity).
4.2. The MeryGrid project test case
This test case is inspired by the MeryGrid project [26],
which is a real pilot project currently under implementation
in the Walloon region of Belgium, in agreement with the en-
ergy regulator, the DSO, the companies (entities) that con-
stitute the community, and their energy retailers.
There are four entities. Entity 1 is a non-flexible load. En-
tity 2 is composed of a non-flexible load and a (non-steerable)
photovoltaic plant with 70 kWp of installed power. Entity 3
is composed of a non-flexible load and a hydro-electric plant
with a capacity of about 200 kVA, treated as a non-steerable
generator. Finally, entity 4 is a 270 kWh battery storage
system, with 150 kW and 300 kW of maximum charging and
discharging power, respectively, and charging and discharging
efficiencies both equal to 0.95.
Table 1: Statistical indexes of load and generation profiles (in kW).
Entity Device Max Min Avg Std
1 Load 288.40 0.00 23.13 29.84
2
Load 91.20 0.00 16.76 17.94
Gen 68.96 0.00 3.66 9.63
3
Load 271.64 0.00 9.02 24.86
Gen 189.82 0.00 74.64 51.86
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Demand and generation profiles of the three loads and two
generators are available for the whole year 2017 with time
step ∆T = 15 min. The maximum, minimum and average
values of these profiles (in kW), as well as their standard
deviation, over the considered year are reported in Table 1.
One instance of the proposed optimization model is solved for
every day of the year. For each instance, the number of time
periods is T = 96, while the number of optimization vari-
ables and constraints is around 5500 and 5900, respectively.
The average computation time for a single instance is around
6.36 s on a 4-core 3.6 GHz Intel i7-7700 CPU with 32 GB
of RAM. Unitary peak power price, community operator fee,
and cost of storage usage are those defined in Sections 4.1.1
and 4.1.3. The prices of energy imported from and exported
to the grid are assumed to be constant over the whole period,
with values given at the beginning of Section 4. For the stor-
age system, the state of charge at the beginning and at the
end of the day are set equal to half of its maximum capac-
ity, namely 135 kWh. Reserve provision is ignored. Indeed,
only the storage system is able to provide symmetric reserve
in this example, and when increasing the price of reserve,
the storage system tends to provide only reserve, and not to
participate in the community.
Results for this test case are summarized in Figs. 9 and
10. Figure 9a shows the monthly cost of using the battery
storage, while Fig. 9b shows the fee paid monthly to the
community operator. Since unitary cost of storage usage and
community operator fee are constant over the whole year,
these costs are directly proportional to the amounts of en-
ergy exchanged monthly with the storage unit, and among
the entities of the community, respectively. Figure 10a shows
the stacked bar plot of the monthly gains of all the entities.
The height of each bar represents the monthly gain of the
community as a whole. Notice that, for each entity u, the
monthly (resp. yearly) gain is the cumulative value at the
end of a month (resp. year) of the daily gains Ju − JSUu . All
the entities except entity 4 have nonnegligible gains. On a
yearly scale, entities 1 and 2 enjoy cost savings amounting to
28.36% and 37.98%, respectively, while entity 3 has a revenue
increase of 73.47%. On the other hand, entity 4 gains only
180 e at the end of the year. This can be explained in analogy
with the toy example of Section 4.1.3. Entity 4 (connected to
the storage unit) typically sells energy to the community at a
price which only balances the costs for buying energy (includ-
ing efficiency losses) and for its usage. Finally, boxplots of
percent daily gains are shown in Fig. 10b for the community
and for entities 1, 2 and 3. These percent gains vary sig-
nificantly from day to day, but the median value is between
19% and 62% in all the cases reported. For entity 4 percent
daily gains cannot be computed, because its daily profit when
acting individually is always zero (recall that piigrt > pi
egr
t ).
5. Conclusions
This paper has introduced a modelling framework, based
on bilevel programming, for structuring and solving the in-
ternal local market of a community microgrid, composed
of entities which may exchange energy and services among
themselves. The proposed framework has two main features.
First, it guarantees a market-oriented pricing of energy ex-
changes within the community by implementing a social wel-
fare maximization approach based on the marginal pricing
scheme. Second, by imposing a Pareto-superior condition,
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(b) Boxplots of percent daily gains.
Figure 10: Gains for the community and for each entity.
it ensures that no entity is penalized by participating in the
community, as compared to acting individually, which is a
fundamental requirement for building a solid and long-lasting
community. Numerical results obtained on a real test case
implemented in Belgium show that the proposed framework
is effective in enhancing the welfare of the community mem-
bers, which gain between 28% and 74% on a yearly scale,
with respect to the case when they act individually.
The approach of this paper can be readily extended to
handle curtailment of power generation, different sharing
schemes of both community reserve and community peak
power, and more advanced demand side models, as long as
the lower level problem of the proposed bilevel model remains
a linear program.
Further work aims at studying advanced formulations of
the upper level problem, in order to achieve a better shar-
ing of the benefits of the community among all the entities,
as well as analyzing possible strategic behaviors of the par-
ticipants. Current research is also focusing on the introduc-
tion of smart buildings, electric vehicles, and community-of-
communities concepts in the proposed framework. Finally,
another frontier is to look for integration of communities into
existing electricity markets [39].
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Appendix A. Lower level dual constraints
This appendix reports the dual constraints of the lower
level problem described in Section 3.1.1. These constraints
are obtained by applying standard tools of duality theory in
linear programming.
The dual constraint of asted,t ≥ 0 is defined as:
ϕsted,t − picomu,t ∆TP sted,t + P sted,t (ρinct − ρdect ) ≥ −pisted,tP sted,t ∆T
(A.1)
The dual constraint of ashed,t ≥ 0 is defined as:
ϕshed,t − picomu,t ∆TCshed,t + Cshed,t (ρinct − ρdect ) ≥ −pished,t Cshed,t ∆T
(A.2)
The dual constraints of achad,t ≥ 0 and adisd,t ≥ 0 are respectively:
ϕchad,t −∆TP dηchad σd,t + ∆TP dpicomu,t +
+ P dϕ
s−
d,t ≥ −γstod ∆TP dηchad (A.3)
ϕdisd,t +
∆TP d
ηdisd
σd,t −∆TP dpicomu,t +
+ P dϕ
s+
d,t ≥ −γstod
∆TP d
ηdisd
(A.4)
The dual constraints of sd,t ∈ R for t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1} and
t = T are respectively:
ϕsocUpd,t − ϕsocLod,t + σd,t − σd,t+1 −
κs+d,tη
dis
d
∆T
+
κs−d,t
ηchad ∆T
= 0
(A.5)
ϕsocUpd,T − ϕsocLod,T + σd,T + ζd −
κs+d,T η
dis
d
∆T
+
κs−d,T
ηchad ∆T
= 0
(A.6)
The dual constraints of ecomu,t ≥ 0 and icomu,t ≥ 0 are respec-
tively:
picomu,t − µt ≥ −γcom (A.7)
−picomu,t + µt ≥ −γcom (A.8)
The dual constraints of egriu,t ≥ 0 and igriu,t ≥ 0 are respectively:
picomu,t − ϕpeakt /∆T + (ϕeCapu,t − ϕiCapu,t )/∆T ≥ piegrt (A.9)
− picomu,t + ϕpeakt /∆T + (ϕiCapu,t − ϕeCapu,t )/∆T ≥ −piigrt
(A.10)
The dual constraints of rs+d,t ≥ 0 and rs−d,t ≥ 0 are respectively:
κs+d,t + ϕ
s+
d,t − ρinct ≥ 0 (A.11)
κs−d,t + ϕ
s−
d,t − ρdect ≥ 0 (A.12)
The dual constraint of rsym ≥ 0 is defined as:∑
t∈T
(ρinct + ρ
dec
t ) ≥ pires (A.13)
The dual constraint of p ≥ 0 is defined as:
−
∑
t∈T
ϕpeakt ≥ −pipeak (A.14)
Appendix B. Strong duality
The following expression represents the objective function
of the lower level dual problem:
∑
t∈T
( ∑
d∈Dshe
ϕshed,t +
∑
d∈Dste
ϕsted,t +
∑
d∈Dsto
ϕchad,t +
∑
d∈Dsto
ϕdisd,t
)
+
∑
t∈T
∑
d∈Dsto
(
ϕsocUpd,t Sd − ϕsocLod,t Sd
)
−
∑
t∈T
∑
u∈U
picomu,t
( ∑
d∈Dnstu
∆TP
nst
d,t −
∑
d∈Dsheu
∆TC
she
d,t +
−
∑
d∈Dnflu
∆TC
nfl
d,t
)
+
∑
d∈Dsto
σd,1S
init
d +
∑
d∈Dsto
ζdS
end
d
+
∑
t∈T
∑
d∈Dsto
(
− κs+d,tηdisd Sd/∆T + ϕs+d,tP d
+ κs−d,tSd/(η
cha
d ∆T ) + ϕ
s−
d,tP d
)
+
∑
t∈T
ρinct
( ∑
d∈Dste
P sted,t +
∑
d∈Dshe
Cshed,t
)
+
∑
u∈U
∑
t∈T
(ϕeCapu,t E
cap
u,t + ϕ
iCap
u,t I
cap
u,t ) (B.1)
The strong duality condition requires the identity, at the op-
timum, of the values of the primal objective function (4) and
the dual objective function (B.1).
Appendix C. Proofs
Appendix C.1. Sum of bilinear terms involving community
prices and community import/export
This appendix shows that identity (25) holds at the opti-
mum of the lower level problem. First, we notice that
ecomu,t pi
com
u,t = e
com
u,t (µt − γcom). (C.1)
If ecomu,t = 0, the identity is trivial. If e
com
u,t > 0, it follows from
the complementary slackness condition corresponding to the
dual constraint (A.7), implying picomu,t = µt − γcom. Similarly,
icomu,t pi
com
u,t = i
com
u,t (µt + γ
com), (C.2)
where the identity is trivial when icomu,t = 0, while it follows
from the complementary slackness condition corresponding
to the dual constraint (A.8), implying picomu,t = µt + γ
com,
when icomu,t > 0. By using (C.1) and (C.2), we obtain:∑
t∈T
∑
u∈U
picomu,t
(
ecomu,t − icomu,t
)
=
=
∑
t∈T
∑
u∈U
ecomu,t (µt − γcom)−
∑
t∈T
∑
u∈U
icomu,t (µt + γ
com) =
=
∑
t∈T
∑
u∈U
µt(e
com
u,t − icomu,t )− γcom
∑
u
∑
t
(ecomu,t + i
com
u,t )
= −γcom
∑
t∈T
∑
u∈U
(
ecomu,t + i
com
u,t
)
,
where the last equality holds due to (12).
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Appendix C.2. No simultaneous import/export
This section shows that no simultaneous import from or
export to the grid is possible by the same entity at the same
time, as long as piegrt 6= piigrt .
Indeed, from the dual constraints (A.9) and (A.10), due to
the complementary slackness conditions, the following hold:
if egriu,t > 0 then pi
com
u,t −
ϕpeakt
∆T
+
ϕeCapu,t − ϕiCapu,t
∆T
= piegrt
(C.3)
if igriu,t > 0 then pi
com
u,t −
ϕpeakt
∆T
+
ϕeCapu,t − ϕiCapu,t
∆T
= piigrt .
(C.4)
Then, if piegrt 6= piigrt , the conditions (C.3) and (C.4) cannot
hold simultaneously. Therefore, the variables egriu,t and i
gri
u,t
cannot be both strictly positive at the same time.
Notice that, for similar considerations on the conditions
(C.1) and (C.2), as long as γcom 6= 0, it is not even possible to
have simultaneous import from and export to the community
by the same entity.
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